The reasoning behind uses of confidence intervals and p-values in scientific practice may be made coherent by modeling the inferring statistician or scientist as an idealized intelligent agent. With other things equal, such an agent regards a hypothesis coinciding with a confidence interval of a higher confidence level as more certain than a hypothesis coinciding with a confidence interval of a lower confidence level. The agent uses different methods of confidence intervals conditional on what information is available. The coherence requirement means all levels of certainty of hypotheses about the parameter agree with the same distribution of certainty over parameter space. The result is a unique and coherent fiducial distribution that encodes the post-data certainty levels of the agent.
Introduction
In the years following the oracle that some form of ducial inference may play a pivotal role in 21st-century statistics (Efron, 1998) , there has been an ongoing resurgence of interest in ducial distributions that generate condence intervals (e.g., Schweder and Hjort, 2002; Singh et al., 2005; Polansky, 2007; Singh et al., 2007; Tian et al., 2011; Bityukov et al., 2011; Kim and Lindsay, 2011; Bickel, 2011b Bickel, , 2012b and in ducial distributions more generally (e.g., Hannig et al., 2006; Hannig, 2009; Xiong and Mu, 2009; Gibson et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2012) . Fiducial inference initially promised an objective alternative to Bayesianism as a form of inductive reasoning (Fisher, 1973) but has historically suered from problems of understanding the meaning of ducial probability and from the ability to derive conicting ducial probabilities from the same family of sampling distributions (see Wilkinson, 1977) . This paper addresses both diculties by interpreting ducial probability in terms of the theories of coherent decision making that also undergird Bayesian inference.
The main thesis is that many of the usual applications of condence intervals in science lead to reasonable inferences that can be improved by enforcing self-consistency in the technical sense of probabilistic coherence, which does not in itself require Bayesian posterior distributions (Hacking, 1967; Goldstein, 1997; Bickel, 2012a) . Using a condence interval procedure is reasonable when the condence level of the interval estimate computed using the observed data is at least approximately monotonic with the degree of certainty or level of belief that the statistician has in saying the true value of the parameter lies in the interval (Cox, 1958) . In other words, higher condence levels correspond to higher subjective levels of certainty of the statistician adopting the condence procedure; otherwise, a dierent procedure should be adopted in the absence of other considerations. If consistent with one another, the certainty levels of that statistician can be encoded as a probability distribution on parameter space known as a condence distribution. If the same statistician would reasonably and self-consistently use another condence procedure for another parameter in the data analysis, the levels of certainty of the rst parameter can still be represented as a probability distribution, this time a ducial distribution that need not be a condence distribution. The situation described here is abstracted by replacing the actual statistician with an articially intelligent agent that either approximates the certainty levels of the actual decision-makers or that serves to derive the hypothetical consequences of adopting its ducial distributions for statistical inference.
The metaphor of a decision-making agent that has a unique ducial distribution for any data set leads to coherent hypothesis tests, point estimates, and interval estimates without the requirement of eliciting the actual levels of belief of any human agent. Since the coherent agent is fully determined by choices of condence interval and hypothesis testing procedures, the subjectivity involved is no greater than that already present in frequentist inference. While some likelihoodists have criticized frequentism for even that subjectivity (Royall, 1997, 3.7) , the subjectivity involved in selecting the rejection region for signicance testing coheres with post-positivistic philosophies of science that frankly acknowledge that scientic inference is not a matter of following an algorithm (Polanyi, 1962, 3.1) .
Section 2 provides preliminary concepts and propositions, demonstrating that interpreting condence levels as certainty levels or hypothetical levels of belief leads either to noncoherent estimates and hypothesis testing or to inference on the basis of a condence distribution of the parameter as if it were a Bayesian posterior distribution. Iterating that reasoning along the lines of Fisher's ducial argument for multiple parameters leads to merging condence distributions into a parameter distribution that is coherent in the sense that it is a probability measure. This is ducial inference in the sense that it is a modern development of ducial reasoning but without the often impractical requirements involving aspects of conditional inference and without violating the rules of ordinary probability theory, that of the Kolmogorov axioms. The framework proposed in Section 2 also diers from Fisher's in its incorporation of nested condence sets of vector parameters. Thus, the proposed framework for inference is presented as a realization of the core ideas behind the original ducial argument, Neyman-Pearson condence intervals, and theories of coherent decision-making that prescribe minimizing expected loss with respect to a posterior distribution (e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953; Savage, 1954) . (Following the usage in Dempster (2008) , Eaton and Sudderth (2010), and Bickel (2012a) , the term posterior herein means datadependent and thus includes but is not limited to a Bayesian posterior relative to some prior.) Section 3 demonstrates that the resulting framework of ducial inference can lead to shrinkage in point and interval estimates toward a null hypothesis value in a way that is not possible in the pure frequentist and pure Bayesian approaches. For example, Figure 1 displays the shrunken parameter estimate as an alternative to the usual frequentist estimate computed after testing the null hypothesis. Given the two-sided p-value PV, the maximumlikelihood estimateθ is simply shrunk to (1 − PV)θ. That value would only be available from Bayes's theorem if the prior depended on the sample size such that the posterior probability of the null hypothesis were equal to PV.
Lastly, remarks elaborating on technical points appear in Section 4, a brief discussion on equating p-values with ducial probabilities in Section 5, and longer proofs in Appendix A. http://biostats.bepress.com/cobra/art95
The concept of a ducial distribution will be introduced in order to ground coherent decision making in the procedure of condence intervals or more general condence sets. In this way, the coherence condition will be supplemented with a condence-based condition in order to prescribe point estimates, interval estimates, hypothesis tests, and other actions that minimize expected loss. The various types of ducial distributions are formulated as frequentist posteriors: the basic ducial distribution is dened in Section 2.1, and other ducial distributions are dened in Section 2.2.
Basic ducial distributions
2.1.1 Fiducial probability as coherent condence
The basic parameter θ and nonbasic parameter γ are in the parameter sets denoted by Θ and Γ, respectively. The distinction between the basic and nonbasic parameters will become clear shortly. For now, it is enough to note that which parameter is basic cannot be a function of which parameter happens to be of interest provided that the background (pre-data) knowledge of the hypothetical agent is xed (Remark 1).
The observed n-tuple x is a member of X , where X ⊆ R n . Let B (X ) denote the σ-eld of Borel subsets of X . The family of distributions of the random variable X of outcome x is {P θ,γ : θ ∈ Θ, γ ∈ Γ}, where each P θ,γ is dened on the measurable space (X , B (X )). 
for all x ∈ X and such that the corresponding nested condence set estimator
for all θ ∈ Θ and γ ∈ Γ, where |•| is the Lebesgue measure. (Since I is an interval in this case, |I| is the width of I.) As a result, |I| is called the condence level of Θ • (I), and p is called the condence curve of Θ (Birnbaum, 1961; Blaker, 2000) .
Lemma 1. If Θ is the procedure of nested condence sets for θ that is dened by some condence curve p, then p X (θ) is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1
Proof. By the denitions of a condence level and a procedure of nested condence sets,
for all I ∈ I, θ ∈ Θ, and γ ∈ Γ. Thus, using I = [α, 1] for any α ∈ [0, 1], the case of a scalar basic parameter (Θ ⊆ Rhave the same order as the levels of certainty a statistician or scientist would place on the hypotheses that the parameter value is within the condence sets. To state this formally for a procedure Θ of nested set estimators, let H x Θ denote the set of nested condence sets corresponding to x ∈ X :
Given any two observations x 1 , x 2 ∈ X and any two parameter subsets Θ 1 ∈ H x 1 Θ and Θ 2 ∈ H x 2 Θ , the hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ 1 is considered no more certain than ( ) the hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ 2 if and only if the highest condence level corresponding to the former hypothesis is less than or equal to that corresponding to the latter:
The parameter θ that denes those hypotheses is called the basic parameter.
Denition 1. Let σ x denote any σ-eld such that H x Θ ⊂ σ x . For any x ∈ X , a probability measure C x on (Θ, σ x ) is a certainty distribution that is compatible with a condence procedure Θ and with its condence curve p if
Other ducial distributions will be dened in Section 2.2.
Example 1. Consider the spherically normal model:
where X is a random column vector of n observable responses, θ ∈ R d is a column vector of d < n unknown means, ξ is a n × d design matrix, γ is the unknown standard deviation, and I is the d × d identity matrix. Thus, x is the xed column vector of n observed responses.
Let θ (x) and γ (x) denote the maximum likelihood estimates of θ and γ, respectively, and let C x be the multivariate t distribution of location d-vector θ, scale matrix γ 2 (x) ξ T ξ, and
is F d,n−d , the random variable distributed as the F -distribution with d, n − d degrees of freedom (Box and Tiao, 1992, 2.7.2) . Let c x denote the probability density function equal to the Radon-Nikodym derivative of C x with respect to the Lebesgue measure. If Θ x is dened by the density contours such that C x ϑ ∈ Θ x (I) = |I| and
for all I ∈ I, then Θ X (I) is a 100 |I| % condence region in the sense that it satises formula (2) (Box and Tiao, 1992, 2.9.0) . According to formula (6), C x is a certainty distribution that is compatible with Θ.
The procedure of nested set estimators also provides a general concept of a condence distribution.
Denition 2. For any x ∈ X , a probability measure K x on (Θ, σ x ) is a condence distribution that is compatible with Θ if, for every Θ 1 ∈ H x Θ ,
where
The denition specied by formula (8) extends the usual condence distribution of a scalar parameter dened on the basis of strictly nested condence intervals (Cox, 1958) to condence distributions of higher-dimensional basic parameters dened on the basis of condence sets that could have Θ x (I 1 ) = Θ x (I 2 ) for some I 1 = I 2 . In the former case, σ x is the Borel eld over Θ. Polansky (2007) , Singh et al. (2007) , and Bickel (2011b Bickel ( , 2012a present alternative denitions of condence distributions of vector basic parameters. The denition used here is a slight generalization of the condence posterior found in Bickel (2012b, 2.3).
The simplest type of ducial distribution is a special case of a condence distribution.
Denition 3. For any x ∈ X , a probability measure Π x on (Θ, σ x ) is a basic ducial distribution that is compatible with Θ if, for every
for all I ∈ I such that Θ x (I) = Θ 1 .
Formulas (8) and (9) are related by Π x (Θ 1 ) = sup K x (Θ 1 ). In Example 1, C x is a basic ducial distribution as well as a certainty distribution. The inequality of formula (9) essentially follows van Berkum et al. (1996) ; see also Bickel (2012b,d ) and references.
Denition 3 sheds light on the relationship between the concepts of a certainty distribution and a basic ducial distribution. Every basic ducial distribution is necessarily a certainty distribution, as is clear from fact that formulas (5) and (9) imply formula (6).
The converse is not necessarily true, but satisfaction of a condition usually met in practice is sucient for a certainty distribution C x to be a basic ducial distribution. The condence procedure Θ is said to be potentially invertible if, for any > 0, there are an x ∈ X and a I x ⊆ I that satisfy
The condition is trivially met when, as in Example 1, Θ x is bijective for all x ∈ X , since in that case |∪ I∈Ix I| = 1 in formula (10) with I x = I
and Θ x = Θ x for all x ∈ X and I ∈ I. The next example illustrates this non-trivial but commonly applicable result:
Theorem 1. With Θ as any interval such that sup Θ = ∞, let Θ be a procedure of nested condence intervals for θ ∈ R that is dened by some condence curve p. If p x (•) is a strictly increasing and continuous function such that lim θ→∞ p x (θ) = 1 for all x ∈ X , then Θ is potentially invertible.
Proof. By Lemma 1, p X (θ) ∼ U (0, 1) for all θ ∈ Θ. It follows that, for any > 0, there is an x ∈ X such that lim θ→inf Θ p x (θ) < . For any such and x, let I x denote the set of all closed interval subsets of [ , 1]. Since |∪ I∈Ix I| = 1 − , inequality (10) clearly holds.
The invertibility of Θ x (•) is a consequence of the stated assumption that p x (•) is strictly increasing and continuous.
Example 2. The observable vector X consists of n independent random variables of distri-
which is the observed Student t statistic with µ as the null hypothesis value, for any x ∈ X .
If the basic parameter is θ = µ 2 , then the nonbasic parameter is the pair γ = (µ/ |µ| , σ), and τ (X; µ) is a pivotal quantity with the Student t distribution of n − 1 degrees of freedom, implying that υ (X; µ) = F 1,n−1 . (The ratio µ/ |µ| is the sign of µ.) A condence procedure Θ can then be constructed by dening the condence curve p according to the upper-tailed p-value
for all x ∈ X , θ ≥ 0, and
is strictly increasing and continuous for all x ∈ X , the conditions of Theorem 1 are met even though Θ X (•) is almost surely not invertible.
Theorem 2. Let Θ be a procedure of nested condence sets for θ that is dened by some condence curve p. If Θ is potentially invertible, then every certainty distribution compatible with Θ is also a basic ducial distribution that is compatible with Θ.
P-values as hypothesis probabilities
The next result provides sucient conditions for equating the certainty level of a simple (point) null hypothesis with a p-value.
Corollary 1. Let Θ be a procedure of nested condence intervals for θ that is dened by some condence curve p. Under the conditions of Theorem 2, every certainty distribution C x compatible with Θ is also a basic ducial distribution that is compatible with Θ and, if
where ϑ ∼ C x , i.e., ϑ is the random variable of distribution C x .
Example 3. Example 2, continued. Since the conditions of Corollary 1 are satised, the certainty level of the hypothesis that the parameter value equals zero is equal to the p-value of the test with θ = 0 as the null hypothesis:
for all x ∈ X and γ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} × ]0, ∞[. That is simply the usual two-sided p-value from the single-sample t-test, as equation (11) makes clear.
In conclusion, since Bayesian posterior probabilities are typically not equal to two-sided p-values, Corollary 1 prevents certainty theory from being regarded as a special case of Bayesian theory (5).
Some operating characteristics of testing hypotheses under the equality of the p-value and the certainty level appear in the remainder of this subsection. They do not in themselves warrant the use of the ducial distribution but rather report some of its repeated-sampling properties. Here, δ i,j is Kronecker's delta: δ θ 0 ,θ 0 = 1 and δ θ,θ 0 = 0 for θ = θ 0 .
Theorem 3. Consider the null hypothesis that θ = θ 0 for some θ 0 ∈ Θ. For a Type I error cost I > 0 and a Type II error cost II > 0, the loss function
to minimize expected loss with respect to a certainty distribution C x that is compatible with a condence curve p and that meets the criteria of Corollary 1 for all x ∈ X , then
where = I / II , and α ( ) = (1 + ) −1 is the Type I error rate of a (X).
Proof. It is known that some algebra leads to
leads to equation (14) by substitution. Because p X (θ 0 ) ∼ U (0, 1) by Lemma 1 under θ = θ 0 , the Type I error rate is
For instance, equation (14) 
Proof. By equation (14),
According to equation (15), the rst factor of the right-hand-side is α ( ).
Since the loss function of Theorem 3 may be less applicable when a p-value is reported as a measure of evidence rather than compared to a xed signicance level, quadratic loss of the p-value as a point estimator of a hypothesis truth value is often considered (Bickel, 2012a) . In this context, Hwang et al. (1992) and Morgenthaler and Staudte (2005) nd that the p-value is not necessarily admissible under the frequentist decision theory of Wald (1961) . However, the next theorem indicates that the p-value is often optimal according to theories of minimizing expected loss with respect to the agent's parameter distribution (e.g., Savage, 1954) . Its repeated-sampling performance under the null hypothesis is quantied in the corollary.
Theorem 4. Consider the null hypothesis that θ = θ 0 for some θ 0 ∈ Θ. The quadratic
. If the action δ (x) ∈ [0, 1] is chosen to minimize expected loss with respect to a certainty distribution C x that is compatible with a condence curve p and that meets the criteria of Corollary 1 for all
Proof. A standard result (e.g., Lad, 1996) is that δ (x) = C x (ϑ = θ 0 ) minimizes expected quadratic loss for any parameter distribution C x . Corollary 1 implies that
Corollary 3. If θ = θ 0 in addition to the assumptions of Theorem 4, then the loss averaged over the sample space is
Proof. Theorem 4 gives δ (x) = p x (θ 0 ), with the result that
where, by equation Corollary 1, U ∼ U (0, 1). Finally, E (U 2 ) = 1 /3 and E (U ) = 1 /2.
Other ducial distributions
As above, the distribution of X depends on the value of some full parameter. Let Φ denote a set of target parameter values, where each target parameter value is a function of the full parameter value. Hypothesis tests, eect-size estimates, and other actions may depend on the value of the target parameter. In other words, any potential parameter of interest is a function of the target parameter. The possible dependence of the distribution of X on another parameter, called the nontarget parameter, is suppressed for notational economy.
Suppose there are measurable spaces φ ) ) for any φ ∈ Φ, with the interpretation that φ and φ are subparameters of φ that together contain all the information in φ. Accordingly,
• and • are called subparameter functions.
The general denition of a ducial distribution is self-referential with the recursion stopping at one or more basic ducial distributions (Denition 1).
Denition 4. Consider a ducial distribution Π
(1)
(1) and a probability distribu-
[0, ∞[ denote the probability density functions dened in terms of Radon-Nikodym dierentiation of Π
x and Π
x (•|φ ) with respect to the same dominating measure. A probability distribution Π x on a measurable space (Φ, Σ) is called the joint ducial distribution that extends Π
x if it corresponds to a probability density function π x :
for all φ ∈ Φ and if P (2)
x (•|φ ) : φ ∈ Φ satises these conditions:
1. For all φ ∈ Φ such that φ is a function of φ , the probability distribution Π
x (•|φ ) is ∆ φ , the Dirac measure with support at φ (probability distribution concentrated at φ ).
2. Let Φ denote the set of all φ ∈ Φ such that φ is not a function of φ . At least one of the following statements holds:
which is the conditional probability distribution of ϕ (2) given φ (1) ϕ (2) = φ , where ϕ (2) is the random variable distributed as some ducial distribution Π
x (•|φ ) is a ducial distribution. In this case, the probability distribution Π (2)
is called the marginal ducial distribution with respect to Π
Any parameter distribution is a ducial distribution if it is a probability distribution that can be deduced from a basic ducial distribution or a joint ducial distribution.
According to the denition and Kolmogorov probability theory, any distribution of a parameter is a ducial distribution if it is a basic ducial distribution, a conditional ducial distribution, a marginal ducial distribution, or a joint ducial distribution. While basic ducial distributions are necessarily condence distributions, other ducial distributions are often not condence distributions.
The joint ducial distributions of Examples 4 and 5 are well-known posterior distributions derived by Fisher via his ducial argument and by Jereys via improper priors (Jereys, 1998, 7.1) . Specic instances of ducial distributions that have no Bayesian counterpart are introduced for the rst time in Section 3.
Example 4. As in Example 2, the observable vector X consists of n independent random variables of distribution P θ,σ = N (θ, σ 2 ) with θ and σ unknown. With the parameterization φ = (θ, σ 2 ), dene the subparameter functions such that φ = σ 2 and φ = θ for all φ ∈
for all x ∈ X , θ ∈ R, and σ ∈ ]0, ∞[, whereθ (x) andσ 2 (x) are the usual estimates of the mean and variance. Since υ (X; σ) has a χ 2 distribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom for
for all x ∈ X , θ ∈ R, and σ ∈ ]0, ∞[. Likewise, since τ (X; θ, σ) has a standard normal distribution for all θ ∈ R and σ ∈ ]0, ∞[, there is a random variable ϑ (σ 2 ) of basic ducial distribution Π (2)
for all x ∈ X , θ ∈ R, and σ ∈ ]0, ∞[. The distribution Π x of the resulting random variable 
x , nding that the posterior mean ϕ =θ = ϑ (s 2 ) dΠ
has the Student t distribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom.
That marginal ducial distribution is also the condence distribution for θ that corresponds to τ (X; θ, σ (X)) as the pivotal quantity (Wilkinson, 1977) .
In that example, the ducial distribution of the parameter of interest is a condence distribution. That is not always the case, as the next example makes clear.
Example 5. For samples of sizes n 1 and n 2 from two dierent normal populations of unknown means (θ 1 , θ 2 ) and variances (σ 2 1 , σ 2 2 ), the n i -tuple X i = (X i,1 , . . . , X i,n 1 ) has independently distributed components X i,j ∼ N (µ i , σ 2 i ) for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, . . . , n i . The parameter of interest is the dierence in means, θ = θ 1 − θ 2 . As seen in Example 4, marginal inferences may be made about θ i on the basis of the random parameterθ i , distributed according to the marginal ducial distribution such that
has the Student t distribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom for i = 1, 2, whereθ i (x) andŝ i (x) are the observed estimates of the mean and variance for the ith sample. Let φ = (φ , φ ) = (θ 1 , θ 2 ), let C denote the ducial distribution ofθ 1 , and let Π
x (•|φ ) denote the ducial distribution of ϑ 2 for all θ 1 ∈ R. Since marginalization according to equation (16) implies thatθ 1 andθ 2 are independent, the marginal ducial distribution of ϑ =θ 1 −θ 2 is the Behrens-Fisher ducial distribution of the dierence in means (Fisher, 1935) . As has often been pointed out, that ducial distribution does not lead to exact condence intervals; thus, the ducial distribution of ϑ is not a condence distribution.
Because a sampling model and data set do not lead to a unique ducial distribution, it is useful at this point to formalize the concept of a hypothetical intelligent agent that ultimately bases its decisions on condence intervals. Let P denote the set of all ducial distributions on (Φ, Σ) that can be constructed with X as the data space. A ducial agent (FA) is a function Π : X → P such that its basic ducial distributions are derived from the same procedures of nested condence sets and such that its joint ducial distributions are related to its other ducial distributions by equation (16) (2008) and Hannig (2009) Example 6. Welch (1947) with ordering levels of certainty according to the condence levels of Welch (1947) . This has far-reaching implications for statistical practice (Remark 1).
In some cases, the statistician may have diculty in committing to a single FA. When multiple FAs are equally suitable as representations of the posterior beliefs of a scientist, organization, or other real agent, the most representative FAs may be coherently combined into a single posterior distribution via simple arithmetic averaging (see, e.g., Paris, 1994) or the game-theoretic method of Bickel (2012d) . The combined posterior distribution will not necessarily be a ducial distribution.
Certainty based on a plausible null hypothesis
In many applications involving testing the null hypothesis that that φ = φ 0 for some φ 0 ∈ Φ, the parameter value φ 0 is regarded as a priori more plausible than any other parameter value, at least for the sake of argument or reporting. That information can be encoded in joint ducial distributions by using the Dirac measure in place of a basic ducial distribution, as Denition 4 allows.
A simple and widely applicable way to do that begins by dening φ as a distance from the most plausible parameter value. In this setting, Φ x compatible with a condence curve p
for all x ∈ X , φ ∈ Φ\ {φ 0 }, and γ ∈ Γ, where Γ is the set of possible values of the nontarget parameter, which in this subsection is required to be nonbasic (2.1). To dene Π
(1) x , the parameter φ will be broken into its magnitude component φ and direction component, a member of
Let υ (x; φ , δ, γ) = |τ (x; φ δ, γ)| and P φ ,δ,γ = P φ δ,γ for all x ∈ X , φ ∈ Φ\ {φ 0 }, δ ∈ D φ 0 , and γ ∈ Γ. Suppose there is a random variable ϑ (1) of basic ducial distribution Π
(1) x,φ 0 that is compatible with a procedure of nested condence sets for θ
(1) that is dened by some condence curve p
•,φ 0 . This ducial distribution must satisfy
for all x ∈ X , φ ∈ Φ\ {φ 0 }, δ ∈ D φ 0 , and γ ∈ Γ. Since the ducial distribution Π (2) x generates conditional ducial distributions according to equation (17) •|ϑ (2) = φ 0 :
The certainty level of the plausible null hypothesis is equal to a p-value since Π
(1) x,φ 0 meets the conditions of Corollary 1 and since
Simplication in the form of
(equality up to measure 0) is possible in the case that Π
x is continuous. The next example illustrates this.
Example 7. In the notation of this subsection, equation (13) of Example 3 says Π
, where p x,0 (0) is the usual two-sided p-value from the single-sample t-test of the null hypothesis that the mean is equal to 0, i.e., that φ = φ 0 . Thus, equation (20) equates that p-value with the posterior level of certainty in that hypothesis: C x,0 (ϕ = 0) = p x,0 (0) . By contrast, the basic ducial distribution Π (2) x assigns 0 certainty to the hypothesis Π (2) x ϑ (2) = 0 = 0 since it admits a continuous density function: the continuous ran-
x is proportional to a noncentral t variate according to expression (7), in which d = 1 here. Using the same example but with a known variance and in the multivariate setting (d ≥ 2) of Example 1, Stein (1959) pointed out the discrepancy between Π
2) ∈ • and favored the former for inference about
x,0 corresponds to a condence procedure for mag (θ); Remark 4 briey surveys the literature on this discrepancy. In the context of the prior plausibility of the null hypothesis value φ 0 = 0 (Bickel, 2012b,d), equation (19) indicates that there can be no conict between the two distributions: Π
x,0 only pertains to the magnitude of θ, and Π (2) x only pertains to its direction. By contrast, in the context of no prior plausibility of one value of φ above any other, Π
x rather than C x,0 would be appropriate for the minimization of expected utility. More formally, C x,0 and Π (2) x correspond to the idealized knowledge bases of dierent agents, one of which may better represent actual knowledge.
3.2 Eect-size estimates shrunk toward the null hypothesis
In this subsection, it is assumed that Π (2) x ϑ (2) = φ 0 = 1, entailing that equation (21) holds. The conditions of Corollary 1 are also taken for granted with the result that every basic ducial distribution considered is a condence distribution.
Point estimation
An estimator of a parameter is considered consistent if it converges in P φ,γ -probability to the true value of the parameter. Similarly, for a scalar parameter (φ ∈ R), the signicance function is called asymptotically powerful (cf. Bickel, 2012a) if it converges in probability to 0 or 1 under the alternative hypothesis (φ = φ 0 ):
Let• x denote the posterior mean of a parameter with respect to its ducial distribution for any observation x ∈ X ; again, posterior abbreviates data-dependent and is not necessarily a Bayesian posterior for a data-independent prior. The posterior means of the ϑ (2) and ϕ dened in Section 3.1 are their expectation values with respect to their ducial distributions:
where φ ∈ Φ is the dummy variable of integration. Setting φ 0 = 0 yields the shrunken parameter estimate advertised in Section 1:φ x = 1 − p
x , as will be exploited in Example 8.
X is a consistent estimator of φ, and if the p-value
is asymptotically powerful, then the alternative-marginal posterior meanφ X is a consistent estimator of φ.
Proof. First, the result is easily obtained in the case of a true null hypothesis (φ = φ 0 ). Sincē 
which is 1 according to equation (23) sinceθ
→ φ by the denition of consistency and
The result is widely applicable. Indeed, for the special case of a scalar basic parameter (φ ∈ R), Singh et al. (2007) found thatθ
X is a consistent estimator of φ under broad conditions.
Example 8. Example 7, continued. For n → ∞, Figure 1 compares the posterior mean based on the ducial distribution to the maximum-likelihood estimate (MLE), which is the sample mean in this case. The plot illustrates how the ducial distribution provides a smooth alternative to estimation after testing with respect to a xed signicance threshold.
Thus, that practice (Fisher, 1925; Montazeri et al., 2010) may be interpreted as a dirty approximation to coherent frequentist inference. However, in this case, no approximation is warranted on computational grounds since the posterior mean is simplyφ x = 1 − p
x according to equation (24), where p
x,0 (0) is the two-sided p-value andθ (2) x is the sample mean.
Smooth shrinkage can also be achieved through methods of frequentist model averaging (FMA) aimed at estimating a parameter (Claeskens and Hjort, 2008) . With respect to point estimation, the certainty-distribution approach and FMA have many of the same advantages over estimation after testing and estimation after model selection, their respective threshold-dependent counterparts. However, existing FMA methods require asymptotic approximations that ducial distributions do not, indicating that the latter may be more reliable for small samples. Nonetheless, ducial distributions can depend nonetheless on asymptotic condence intervals when exact condence intervals are not available. Another advantage of basing point estimation on a joint ducial distribution is coherence with interval estimates.
Interval estimation
Many contexts call for reporting certainty regions, regions that contain the parameter at some specied level of certainty. When the target parameter is a scalar (φ ∈ R), the regions are intervals. In that case, it is convenient to dene the certainty curve as the function
for all x ∈ X and φ ∈ Φ, where ϕ ∼ C x,φ 0 . Unlike p
•,φ 0 and p (2) , this p •,φ 0 is not a condence curve since C x,φ 0 is not a condence distribution. By equation (19),
x (φ) .
Inverting p x,φ 0 yields, for any β ∈ [0, 1],
The interval
is the (β 2 − β 1 ) 100% certainty interval centered at (β 1 + β 2 ) /2 in the presence of the plausible null hypothesis that φ = φ 0 , where 0 ≤ β 1 ≤ β 2 ≤ 1.
It is clear from equation (25) that, for any φ ∈ Φ, those certainty intervals are almost always shorter than the condence intervals based on Π
x . When φ is close to φ 0 , that improvement tends to be substantial. Thus, nested condence intervals successfully generate interval estimates that smoothly shrink toward the plausible hypothesis value rather than retaining the frequentist coverage property that is appropriate when such a value is unknown.
Bickel (2012c) derived the equivalent of equation (25) with an estimated or approximate Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis in place of the p-value p
A key dierence from the present approach is the interpretation of the interval estimates.
Whereas the marginal condence intervals of Bickel (2012c) may be interpreted as an approximation to the physical distribution of the parameter, that interpretation cannot apply to the above certainty intervals since p
is not a Bayesian posterior probability for any data-independent prior (5).
4 Remarks Remark 1. Example 6 brings into bold relief the fundamental dierence between the proposed use of condence distributions and frequentism as it is usually practiced: there is no FA that would switch from the one-sample t-test to the Welch t-test merely due to a change in the parameter of interest. In the ducial distribution approach, inferences for a given agent cohere with each other regardless of choices of the parameter of interest, whereas many frequentists would instead follow Cox (2006) in changing the system of condence intervals according to the parameter of interest even in the absence of changes in background information. The objective Bayesian practice of using reference priors that depend on which parameter is of interest (e.g., Berger, 2009 ) also sacrices coherence in favor of reducing inference to automatic rules (Bickel, 2012e) .
Remark 2. The concise term condence measure (Bickel, 2009) for what is here called a condence distribution is less subject to misunderstanding than other terms in the literature. Many authors call the exact condence measure a condence distribution (e.g., Efron, 1993; Schweder and Hjort, 2002) . By contrast, more recent papers (e.g., Singh et al., 2005 Singh et al., , 2007 use condence distribution for the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of an exact condence measure and use asymptotic condence distribution for the CDF of any condence measure. To avoid the confusion generated by those dierent denitions of condence distribution, the term condence posterior distribution (Bickel, 2011b (Bickel, , 2012a has been suggested as a term that emphasizes its use in minimizing posterior expected loss. Polansky (2007, p. 24 ) coined observed condence levels for probabilities associated with condence measures.
Remark 3. Since Section 2.2 denes the ducial distribution in terms of the procedure of condence intervals that contains the relevant information is relevant to the knowledge base of an intelligent agent, it does not extend the statistical model of the physical system.
That model remains the family of distributions, which is insucient to specify a ducial distribution. However, the basic ducial distribution has much in common with extended models, including the structural models of Fraser (1968) and the pivotal models of Barnard (1980) and Barnard (1995 ) (with Barnard (1996 ). While a structural model is dened by adding a transformation group to the family of distributions, and a pivotal model is dened by adding a pivot to the family, the two are isomorphic under general conditions (Fraser, 1996) . See also McCullagh (2002) and Helland (2004 Helland ( , 2009 ) for closely related extensions of the physical model. These considerations may play a role in discriminating between agents and their corresponding ducial distributions (Remark 4). In contrast with both ducial distributions and extended physical models, Fisher did not intend the ducial argument to depend on any assumptions in addition to the family of distributions (Dawid and Stone, 1982, comment by Fraser) except for the assumption that any physical prior distribution (5) is unknown (Fisher, 1973) .
Remark 4. Previous work related to selecting a ducial distribution according to the available background information is expressed here in the notation of Example 7. Wilkinson (1977) found the nonzero probabilities of the null hypothesis provided by Π
(1) x,0 appropriate when the null hypothesis has plausibility apart from x i . By contrast, he found the 0 probability of the null hypothesis provided by Π (2) x appropriate in the absence of any pre-data information about φ. Wilkinson (1977, pp. 126-127) reasoned that the null hypothesis would not be of sucient interest for statistical inference were it implausible, which is consistent with the agent-based theory of the present paper. One way to determine which agent best represents prior information is to require invariance to certain parameter and data transformations. Helland (2004) proposed choosing between Π
x,0 and Π (2) x on the basis of transformation properties; see Remark 3. Similarly, from a subjective Bayesian viewpoint, whether the uniform prior is appropriate depends on an agent's beliefs (Berger, 1985, 4.7.9) .
While the general theory of Section 2 is built on elements of frequentist and Bayesian reasoning, it leads to distinctive results that can be derived from neither frequentist theory nor Bayesian theory alone. Specically, ordering levels of belief according to condence levels of nested condence intervals in a framework of maximum expected utility leads to ducial distributions that are not necessarily condence distributions or Bayesian posterior distributions.
A striking implication of this ducial approach is the interpretation of the p-value as the level of agent belief in the null hypothesis (2.1.2, 3.1). Given the conditions of Lemma 1
and Corollary 1, the certainty level of a simple null hypothesis is distributed as a p-value under the null hypothesis: C X (ϑ = θ 0 ) ∼ U (0, 1). That sharply conicts with the behavior of the Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis, which converges to 1 under the null hypothesis under widely applicable conditions. Thus, while many ducial distributions are equal to certain objective Bayesian posterior distributions (Jereys, 1998, 7.4) , the joint ducial distributions emphasized in Section 3 have no strict Bayesian counterpart.
The discrepancy between the p-value and Bayesian posterior probabilities of the null hypothesis (Berger and Sellke, 1987) has been explained in terms of treating the simple (sharp) null hypothesis as an approximation of a composite null hypothesis centered at the parameter value of the null hypothesis (Gómez-Villegas and Sanz, 1998) . From the point of view of eect-size estimation, the low probability of a simple null hypothesis is irrelevant if the estimated eect size is too small to be of any practical signicance. For that reason, the impact of the proposed approach on point and interval estimation (3.2) is more relevant to applications than the probability of the null hypothesis in itself.
The tension between the ducial probability and a Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis is also alleviated by recalling that the former is only appropriate inasmuch as the physical distribution of the parameter is unknown. As epistemological distributions, ducial distributions must yield to Bayesian posteriors to the extent that physical priors are known (Bickel, 2011a (Bickel, , 2012b . For example, if a physical prior is fully known, then the Bayesian posterior completely replaces the ducial distribution (Fisher, 1973; Wilkinson, 1977) .
there is an x ∈ X and a I x ⊆ I such that, given any > 0 and δ ∈ ]0, 1[,
for all α ∈ [0, 1 − δ]. Since is arbitrarily small, the function ω must satisfy
for all α ∈ [0, 1 − δ]. Since ω (δ) (the right-hand side) does not depend on α and since C x (0 ≤ p x (ϑ) ≤ 1) = 1, p x (ϑ) is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 for all x ∈ X , and ω (δ) = δ for all δ ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, by formula (26),
for all Θ 1 ∈ H x Θ . In conclusion, C x (Θ 1 ) ≥ |I| for all I ∈ I such that Θ x (I) = Θ 1 .
Substitutions involving formulas (3) and (9) complete the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1 The rst claim follows immediately from Theorems 1 and 2. Since every certainty distribution C x is also a basic ducial distribution, the denition of the latter yields
for all α ∈ [0, 1] such that {θ ∈ Θ : p x (θ) ∈ [0, α]} = [θ 0 , θ 0 ]. Thus,
